The short version
- IAEA inspectors discovered a nearly complete, undeclared nuclear reactor in Syria capable of producing fissile material for weapons.
- The facility contained approximately 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal hidden behind walls and in narrow passages.
- Syria’s new government has granted the agency access to verify sites, marking a shift from the previous administration's secrecy.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that a secret nuclear reactor constructed during the rule of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was designed to produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons. Rafael Grossi, the head of the UN nuclear watchdog, announced the findings after inspectors visited two sites in Syria last month. The revelation underscores the extent of the clandestine program operated by the previous government, which had long denied pursuing nuclear capabilities despite international suspicions.
Inspectors accessed one site in Deir ez-Zor province and another location that Syrian authorities identified but did not publicly disclose. Grossi stated that the configuration and technical features of the reactor made it highly efficient for producing material that could be directly used in fabricating nuclear devices. He described the construction of such a facility as a critical step in a weapons program, noting that the previous leadership actively concealed these activities from global scrutiny.
The discovery follows the ousting of Assad in December 2024, after which the new Syrian government agreed to allow IAEA inspectors access to suspected former nuclear sites. During an August visit, inspectors confirmed that uncovered cooling infrastructure was consistent with that of a nuclear reactor. The agency also visited a previously undeclared site, where they encountered significant obstacles, including walls that had to be torn down and narrow passages that complicated access to hidden nuclear materials.
At the newly verified site, inspectors found boxes scattered throughout the area and confirmed the presence of approximately 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal. The material was stored in the form of fuel rods with cladding. While natural uranium is not directly usable for a nuclear weapon, experts note that it can be diverted to a covert program that further processes it into plutonium. Logan Mintz, a director for nuclear materials security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, emphasized that such material poses a risk if moved toward weapons-grade processing.
The history of this site dates back more than a decade. In 2018, Israel admitted to carrying out a top-secret air raid on the location eleven years earlier. US officials had accused Syria of seeking to build a secret reactor shortly after that strike. Syria formally notified the IAEA of the site’s existence in a letter dated July 17 and invited cooperation in inspecting and verifying any nuclear material found there. This notification marked a significant departure from the opacity that characterized the Assad era.
Grossi emphasized that the uranium is now under IAEA safeguards, with cameras installed at the location to monitor the material continuously. The agency’s priority is ensuring that every gram of the material is accounted for at all times. The question of whether the uranium will remain in Syria or be removed has not been resolved. Grossi indicated that this decision rests with the Syrian government, stating that the IAEA does not dictate such moves but requires full transparency regarding the material's location.
Experts suggest that if deemed safe to move, the uranium could be transported in certified containers to a third country for disposition into a more chemically stable form. This process would allow for potential use in civilian nuclear power plants rather than weapons programs. However, any transport of nuclear material requires robust security measures to prevent theft or sabotage. The situation highlights the complex challenges of managing legacy nuclear materials in post-conflict zones.
The findings were detailed in a confidential report circulated to member states and seen by news agencies. The report confirms that the previous Syrian government was pursuing clandestine activities related to nuclear development. As the IAEA continues its verification efforts, the focus remains on ensuring that no material is diverted for weapons purposes. The cooperation of the current Syrian authorities will be crucial in maintaining oversight and preventing any resurgence of covert nuclear ambitions.
This development adds a new layer to the understanding of Syria’s nuclear history. While Israel’s earlier strike had damaged the facility, the recent inspections reveal that significant infrastructure and material remained intact or were hidden effectively. The IAEA’s ability to access these sites provides unprecedented insight into the scale of the program. The agency’s ongoing monitoring aims to prevent any future violations of non-proliferation norms in the region.
The international community watches closely as the IAEA works with Syrian authorities to secure the material. The presence of 73 tonnes of uranium represents a substantial stockpile that requires careful management. Ensuring that this material is used for peaceful purposes or safely disposed of will be a long-term challenge. The transparency shown by the new government contrasts sharply with the secrecy of the past, offering a potential model for resolving similar issues in other conflict-affected regions.
Sources behind this briefing
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- The Guardian US↗Syrian reactor could have been used for nuclear weapons if completed, UN says
